The Army Strategy sets out four lines of effort with specific goals to chart a course for irreversible momentum by 2028. These lines of effort are: preparation, modernization, reform, alliances and partnerships. The plan for the first phase of the campaign shows the intent of commanders, assigns forces to subordinate main units, deploys the force for operations, and coordinates air and naval support for ground exercises. All offensive operations reach a point – the climax – where the strength of the attacker no longer decisively exceeds that of the defender. If you keep working beyond this point, you risk expanding too much, counterattacking, and winning. The goal of the attack is to achieve crucial goals before orgasm is reached. The integration of operation and maintenance deception plans will make it possible to meet the prospective conservation requirements already mentioned in the context of pre-planned branches and the continuation of large-scale campaigns and exploitation plans. During the attack, deception operations facilitate the advancement and preservation of supplies – the operational commander is the catalyst who converts strategic objectives into operational means – campaigns and major operations – to achieve objectives. It focuses on the implementation of the road map through the staging, execution and use of the results of large-scale operations. Road plans set long-term goals that, in most cases, are achieved in stages. Depending on the enemy`s center of gravity, they can be designed to defeat the enemy in various ways, such as: In the traditional sense, a line of operations is “an imaginary line between the troop`s base of operations and the target.”  In contrast, a logical line of operation is one in which “the reference of position to enemy forces has little relevance”.
 Essentially, an OLT was a strategy or set of measures to address a military or non-military problem in counterinsurgency, stability operations, or other operations that did not focus on major combat operations. These issues included traditional military objectives such as ensuring security or training host country security forces, or unconventional tasks such as providing social services, economic development or building government capacity. In 2011, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0: Operations dropped the term in favor of the term “Line of Effort.” Since there is no common doctrinal equivalent in the U.S. military, the term has become obsolete in U.S. military parlance. The terms still exist in various U.S. doctrine references that have not been updated since 2011. Deception at the operational level falls within the purview of the theatre army component, the army group, the field army and, in some cases, corps commanders. The purpose of deception operations at the operational level of warfare is to influence the decisions of enemy commanders before a battle takes place. This is done so that the tactical outcome of battles and battles is favorable and then operationally exploitable.
The goal is to maintain the flow of operations. For this reason, operational deception has a much greater profit potential than those at the tactical level. A logical line of operations (LL) is an outdated concept of U.S. military doctrine. It was originally used with the distinct term line of operations, which described a geographical line from a base of operations to a military target. The term “logical” referred to the pursuit of military objectives that did not necessarily require a physical or geographic description, such as government capacity building and development activities. Conservation operational planners must ensure that core facilities, support priorities, lines of communication (LOCs) and troop movements support key lines of operation. They must also be robust enough to delay reaching the peak until they have reached the consensus decision point in anticipation of enemy attacks – hostile operational centers of gravity may be a function of the political, economic, military, sociological, ideological or psychological context (or combinations thereof) that evokes the presence of the enemy. Operational centers of gravity were characterized as follows: Planning for major operations begins before the war (as long as a campaign plan is in place) or can begin as branches or continuations of campaign plans. Key operations are coordinated elements of campaigns, and their results affect the different phases of a campaign plan.
SL 1: Development Readiness – The Army is responsible under Division 10 to generate task forces that are organized, trained and equipped for rapid and sustained ground combat. The military`s main effort through 2022 is to strengthen war readiness and lethality to prioritize war readiness and other large-scale emergency operations. The deceptions developed around branches and continuations of campaigns and major operational plans weaken the robustness with which the enemy can maintain his center of gravity. The Army Strategy outlines the strategic environment and the efforts the Army will pursue to achieve the Army`s vision by 2028. The total army will strengthen readiness, modernize concepts and capabilities, reform processes; and strengthen alliances and partnerships to ensure the dominance of land power on any battlefield, against any threat and at any time. Meeting the integration requirement already mentioned will improve business continuity (in terms of scale of operations and strengths). Offensive deception operations can take the form of representations, tricks or demonstrations (which reduce enemy maneuvers or fire-induced wear) or a combination of representations, tricks and demonstrations. All of them contribute to delaying the premature realization of friendly orgasms.
Lines of operation define the direction of a force relative to the enemy. Multiple lines of operation in a campaign are not uncommon, although there is often only one per campaign or major operation. This line(s) geographically connect the friendly base(s) to the operational target. By manipulating these lines, it is possible to mislead the enemy into taking inappropriate action (see Figure 2-1). the creation and manipulation of central and multiple support bases in conjunction with internal and external support lines; are the means by which the conservation system is deceptively improved. References to carrier lines are found in FM 100-5. Depending on their suitability for the situation, all five should be pursued simultaneously to weaken the causes of the uprising. Because many of these tasks go beyond the traditional scope of the U.S. military, this concept is tied to the deployment of provincial reconstruction teams (civilian reconstruction experts embedded in combat troops).
The term “logical line of operations” was abolished in U.S. Army doctrine by FM 3-0: Operations. It was replaced by the term Line of Effort.  The amendment distinguishes lines of operations, which are now strictly geographical designations, from the conceptual line of effort, which “combines several tasks and missions with the logic of the objective – cause and effect – to focus efforts on creating operational and strategic conditions.”  LOE 4: Strengthen Alliances and Partnerships – The Army will continue to train and fight with allies and partners and must therefore strive to further integrate them into operations to increase interoperability. Operational commanders plan and conduct large-scale campaigns and operations ranging from ports and support areas well beyond the line of contact to equally distant sources of enemy support.